



AIGW Policy Observatory

Global AI Governance & Workforce Transformation

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AIGW ENTERPRISE WORKFORCE TRANSITION DEEP DIVE | CHINA

From Domain Experts to AI Workflow Builders

Changan Automobile and the Organisational
Work of AI Implementation in China

October 2026

EVIDENCE REVIEWED THROUGH

13 October 2026

A decorative graphic in the bottom right corner consisting of several concentric, curved lines in shades of blue and purple, creating a sense of motion or a stylized 'C' shape.

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CHANGAN AUTOMOBILE · DEEP DIVE

Executive Snapshot

A quality engineer who had never written code builds a tool for an everyday factory problem. An electrical engineer turns the calculation logic used by experienced colleagues into an AI-assisted harness-selection application. A logistics administrator decomposes a supplier-packaging review into small automated steps. A procurement digitalisation manager maintains and shares reusable AI capabilities with colleagues.

These are among the changes described in reports on **Changan Automobile** published after journalists visited the Chinese manufacturer in early September 2026. They point to a workforce question that is easy to overlook in coverage of enterprise AI: **what changes when the people who understand the work also begin building the tools through which the work is performed?** [CA02](#) · [CA05](#) · [CA06](#)

The surrounding organisational effort is real enough to warrant close study. In its **2026 half-year report**, the listed company described 11 transformation project groups, 18 AI-master projects with 160 deployed scenarios, more than 3.11 million cumulative employee uses and over 13 million autonomous AI executions across its AI activities. The filing also describes an internal AI

platform. These are company-reported programme indicators—not evidence of verified job creation, workforce reduction or the individual returns from September's QwenWork tools. [CA01](#)

AIGW interpretation: Changan illustrates a *domain-expert builder pathway*. A business employee identifies a recurring problem and makes the rules explicit; AI helps turn those rules into an executable tool; domain experts inspect outputs and deal with exceptions; enterprise teams face the further task of making the tool usable, safe, maintainable and transferable. This is a plausible bridge from personal AI adoption to organisational capability, not proof that all of Changan has completed an AI-native transformation.

The public record has important limits. Several efficiency figures are from employees' accounts or press demonstrations, not independent comparable tests. The reports do not establish formal role reclassification, wages, promotions, redeployment, headcount impacts or detailed approval and override rules for these applications. The distinction between **reported task change** and **measured workforce outcome** is central to this case.

CASE PROFILE

At a Glance

FIGURE 01

Qualitative evidence

Changan at a glance

Dimension	Evidence-supported assessment
Institutional context	Chongqing Changan Automobile Company Limited and specifically reported units including Hebei Changan; do not assume all observations describe every group subsidiary ^[1]
Industry / jurisdiction	Automotive manufacturing / China ^[1]
Work units in scope	Engineering calculations and visualisation; quality data entry and vehicle-document checking; supplier-packaging review; procurement digitalisation; customer-insight analysis ^[2]
AI form	QwenWork-enabled tool and workflow creation alongside Changan's broader pre-existing AI programmes ^[2]
Main AI mechanisms	Task automation and augmentation through employee-built applications and workflow scripts ^[2]
Most clearly evidenced transitions	Task Compression and Workflow Redesign, with limited evidence of employees adding tool-building responsibilities ^[2]
Workforce response	Formal redeployment, hiring, non-backfill, layoffs and career outcomes not yet evidenced for these work units ^[1]
Human authority	Engineering review and quality-exception handling are described; formal approval, override and accountable owner remain incompletely documented ^[2]
Strongest measured evidence	Company-reported programme counts and attributable descriptions of specific task-time changes; independent productivity evaluation unavailable ^[1]

Source: AIGW synthesis of company disclosure and attributable reporting.

Note: Activity counts, described task changes and unknown workforce outcomes are deliberately kept distinct.

CHANGAN AUTOMOBILE · DEEP DIVE

Work inside the organisation

01

1. Why this case matters: AI moves inside the work

Most public discussion of AI in the automotive industry begins with the vehicle: intelligent driving, smart cockpits, in-vehicle software and automated production equipment. The Changan reports reveal another adoption site—the engineering spreadsheets, factory quality checks, procurement routines and supplier communications through which an automaker functions every day. [CA03](#)

The difference is organisational. A centrally deployed assistant may give employees access to model outputs. A business-built tool requires somebody to decide which problem is worth solving, articulate the required inputs, translate a working rule into a repeatable sequence, test the output and determine whether others can use it. These are not exclusively software-development decisions. They rely on people who understand the original work.

Changan's AI application development manager, **Xiao Shiqiang**, described the shift to *21CBR* as moving away from an emphasis on solving everything through a large system and toward specific people solving specific problems with AI. This is a manager's account of the strategy, not an independent evaluation of its success. [CA05](#)

The case is therefore particularly relevant to workforce architecture. It shows that the boundary between **using enterprise software** and **designing a small part of the enterprise operating system** can begin to move before job titles, headcount or formal HR programmes change.

02

2. What existed before the September QwenWork stories

The 2026 half-year report is a useful counterweight to the event-driven coverage. Changan describes a broader AI strategy, an internal **Xingzhi (星智) platform** for knowledge services and model development, and the coordination of AI assets. It reports AI support for certificate checking, channel site selection, software development and other functions. By the reporting point, 18 AI-master projects had put 160 scenarios online, with over 3.11 million cumulative employee uses and over 13 million AI autonomous executions. Eleven transformation project groups were also described. [CA01](#)

Two safeguards matter when reading this disclosure. First, **scenario counts and execution counts are activity measures**; they are not standardised measures of labour productivity or worker wellbeing. Second, these company-wide indicators relate to an AI programme already in place before the September media visit. They should not be attributed wholesale to QwenWork, one supplier product, or the named employees in the later stories.

The September reporting then adds something the filing cannot: a view of how specific workers identify problems and create or apply tools. We should read the two sources together but keep their units of measurement separate.

CHANGAN AUTOMOBILE · DEEP DIVE

3. Engineering: translating expertise into executable rules

Wiring-harness selection

A vehicle contains many electrical harnesses, each involving parameters such as wire size, pins, load and temperature. Reports describe the manual selection and checking process as repeated spreadsheet work that could occupy an experienced engineer for approximately two days for a vehicle model. Changan electrical systems integration testing engineer **Mao Hai**, with colleagues, documented the logic and inputs in a requirements description and used AI-assisted development to turn them into a calculation tool. The reported result-generation step takes about **five minutes after a parameter table is supplied**.

[CA02](#) · [CA05](#) · [CA07](#)

The analytically interesting part is not the sensational arithmetic ratio sometimes attached to this before-and-after comparison. It is the **division of labour**. Domain specialists make the calculation rules explicit; the AI-assisted tool performs routine calculation and presentation; the reported workflow retains traceable calculation steps for engineers to inspect. AI changes execution, but the source accounts still place technical judgement with engineers. [CA06](#) · [CA07](#)

This is evidence of **Task Compression** and employee participation in tool design. It is *not* a verified 576-fold improvement in end-to-end engineering productivity. The published accounts do not disclose a comparable sample of projects, input preparation time, review duration, rework, error rates or sign-off procedures.

Lighting simulation

Mao is also credited with a lighting-effect visualisation tool that renders proposed effects on a 3D vehicle model. Reporters describe this as making it easier to discuss and align design intentions in a meeting, where verbal explanation or creation of a physical demonstration could previously require a longer cycle. [CA02](#) · [CA08](#)

The likely value here is not simply faster design output. It is **reduced coordination friction**: colleagues can evaluate a representation of the same proposed design rather than translating between descriptions and later demonstrations. The public record does not show whether this changed final design quality or overall new-vehicle development time.

CHANGAN AUTOMOBILE · DEEP DIVE

4. Quality management: business users become tool builders

A workaround for an everyday production constraint

At Hebei Changan, quality systems engineer **Guo Ziya** had worked for 13 years and, according to the reporting, lacked a software-development background. She used QwenWork to make a scanner-compatible Chinese-text conversion tool, addressing a problem where existing scanners could not directly recognise Chinese text. Reporting indicates that the tool had been taken up in multiple Hebei Changan production units. [CA02](#) · [CA05](#)

This matters because the original constraint was neither a frontier model problem nor a grand factory-automation programme. It was a mismatch between a familiar piece of production equipment and the information employees needed to record. A person who understood the failure mode could now participate in constructing a workaround rather than only waiting for a traditional development cycle.

Vehicle-document checking and the human control boundary

The reporting also describes a tool for checking information on vehicle conformity and

accompanying documents against relevant records. It extracts parameters, compares fields and highlights discrepancies for staff attention. The reported time for the per-vehicle checking step moved from **more than ten minutes to approximately one or two minutes**. [CA02](#) · [CA03](#)

Source attribution needs care here. XinhuaNet and *Economic Information Daily* specifically credit Guo with the scanner tool while referring to **other employees** developing document checking. The *Shuzhi Qianxian* account more directly links her to the document application. This report therefore attributes the vehicle-document-checking system to **quality personnel at the plant**, without assigning uncontested sole authorship. [CA02](#) · [CA06](#)

The tool illustrates both the promise and the boundary of employee-led workflow design. Moving the preliminary check into an application can reduce repetitive comparison work. But the reports do not provide the full document-release approval matrix, false-negative rates, formal override rights or validation standard for consequential discrepancies. **A human handling exceptions is not, by itself, a complete account of human decision authority.**

CHANGAN AUTOMOBILE · DEEP DIVE

From local scripts to reusable capability

01

5. Supplier packaging: small scripts inside a complex workflow

The case of **Zhang Yongze**, a logistics packaging administrator in Changan's Hebei operations, demonstrates a different form of work redesign. His work involves packaging reviews across hundreds of suppliers and potentially thousands of parts in a project. Reports describe how, after learning to use QwenWork, he broke parts of the process into **seven or eight scripts** dealing with data gathering, progress summaries and alerts for delayed items. The reports describe a reduction of more than **90% in the workload associated with the relevant review activities**. [CA05](#) · [CA06](#)

The architectural point is the **decomposition of an existing job**. Before an AI tool is useful, a worker needs to know which supplier information can be collected automatically, what counts as a delay, how to group inputs and which cases require escalation. The scripts execute steps, but domain knowledge determines the structure.

The reported improvement should not be recast as a 90% cut in staff hours, wages or headcount. We do not know the frequency and denominator of the measured tasks, the total supplier-review cycle, the time required to fix exceptions, or what Zhang did with the released capacity. This is a strong account of work reorganisation, not an employment-outcome study.

02

6. Procurement digitalisation: from individual Skills to organisational capability

Gong Xuan, a senior digital-project manager in the global procurement platform function, offers a view of the maintenance and reuse problem. According to *International Financial News*, she had moved from cost-related work into a digitalisation role in **January 2025**—before the specific QwenWork deployment reported in September 2026. It would therefore be a chronology error to present that move as a job transition caused by the latter. [CA04](#) ([attributed accessible copy](#)).

Her 2026 working practice is nonetheless notable. She described organising work into **58 reusable Skills or scenarios**, with more than **240 interactions over two weeks** and an **estimated 45 hours saved** in a tool-generated review. The same reporting describes regular sharing of AI methods and efforts to reuse them in colleagues' workflows. These are attributable accounts and estimates, not independent employee productivity records. [CA04](#) · [CA06](#)

This is one of the clearest clues to how individual experimentation might become institutional capability. A useful personal prompt is fragile. A reusable capability needs inputs, definitions, permissions, a way to adapt to other people's data environments, and someone responsible for maintaining it. Such mechanisms could create value well beyond one person's time saving, but neither their cost nor their durability has yet been quantified publicly.

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From analysis to implementation

01

7. Customer voice: faster classification, unchanged need for judgement

Reports also describe AI-assisted analysis of substantial volumes of user feedback. A typical project may involve **20,000–30,000 comments or survey records**, with AI used to classify material, identify sentiment and group recurring viewpoints. One account says a process that previously required days can be performed in **less than half a day**; another discusses a narrower product-comparison analysis producing structured feedback in **around an hour**. These should **not** be merged into one before-and-after benchmark: the work scopes are not demonstrably identical. [CA02](#) · [CA04](#)

Automated clustering may accelerate preparation of evidence for product teams. It does not remove the need to ask whether the underlying sample is representative, whether machine-generated categories are reliable or how the feedback should affect product decisions. Faster analysis is an input to judgement, not proof of better decisions.

02

8. The implementation mechanism: employee invention is not enough

Across these episodes, an identifiable sequence recurs:

Business problem → domain rules or examples → AI-assisted tool construction → output checking and exception handling → repeated use or organisational reuse.

This is **AIGW's interpretation of the case evidence**, not a formal five-step methodology that Changan has publicly certified. It is useful precisely because it identifies where the organisational work begins. AI can lower the technical barrier to producing a script or prototype. It does not by itself settle who may deploy a tool, which data it may access, what counts as a passing quality test, who handles failures, or how a colleague inherits and maintains the tool.

Changan's management accounts indicate that central transformation and AI application teams were involved in scaling the effort. *Economic Information Daily* reports company and supplier managers discussing shared responsibility for business definition, platform capabilities, AI use, reuse of employee Skills and the eventual evaluation of costs and returns. A company manager also described the present emphasis on learning and usage before stricter token-cost optimisation. This is a description of priorities, not a validated cost-benefit analysis.

[CA03](#) · [CA08](#)

The organisational test is therefore **whether successful personal tools become governed, reliable parts of recurring work**. Without that second step, a proliferation of scripts can create its own fragmentation: undocumented dependencies, uneven quality, unclear accountability and excessive reliance on individual enthusiasts. We do not claim these problems have occurred at Changan; they are the risks that an institutional design needs to address.

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9. China-side implementation: from national direction to workplace practice

China's policy environment places unusual emphasis on linking AI capability to concrete sectoral application. The State Council's August 2025 **Opinions on Deepening the “AI+” Initiative** promotes integration across industry and human–AI collaboration. It sets a national direction rather than offering evidence that one named Changan workflow succeeded. [P01](#)

More directly relevant, the eight-agency **“AI + Manufacturing” Special Action Implementation Opinions**, issued in December 2025 and published in January 2026, call for industry-specific use cases, industrial agents, development of professionals who understand both manufacturing and AI, and stronger security and risk controls. Official guidance encompasses R&D design, manufacturing, operations and service applications and places emphasis on scenario selection and evaluation. This is a useful lens for understanding why rule-intensive engineering, quality and procurement processes matter in China's implementation story. [P02](#) ([full official text](#)).

A third policy, the July 2026 **“AI + Human Resources and Social Security” Implementation Opinions**, calls for more integrated labour-demand matching, skills training, capability assessment and monitoring of AI's employment effects. It concerns public human-resources and social-security administration and related employment services; it is **not** a Changan-specific human-resources mandate. Its relevance is analytical: the public reporting on enterprise AI adoption is far richer on uses and task-time estimates than on employees' long-term outcomes. [P03](#)

Together, the policies illuminate a productive tension. The implementation agenda encourages scenario-led diffusion, new combinations of technical and industry expertise, and responsible use. Workplace accounts suggest that some of this innovation can emerge from experienced domain employees, not only centrally trained software specialists. But the research still needs to distinguish **policy ambition, enterprise deployment and worker outcomes**. The three are connected questions; they are not interchangeable evidence.

WORKFORCE ARCHITECTURE

10. What the Workforce Architecture framework reveals

Changan's episodes are particularly strong on **Task Architecture** and **Workflow Architecture**.

Individual calculations, quality checking and administrative routines are being segmented into steps that tools can perform or assist. The work around those steps changes: humans increasingly formulate rules, inspect results, manage exceptions and decide when a tool can be relied upon.

The case provides more limited, but still meaningful, evidence on **Role Architecture** and **Capability Architecture**. Some workers who were not software developers took on tool-creation and configuration tasks. This is evidence of **new responsibilities within work**, not yet evidence of revised job descriptions or formal career transitions. The capability at issue is not generic “prompting”; it combines existing technical or operational expertise with the ability to express that knowledge in a form an AI system can use.

It is weaker on **Learning Architecture**. Self-directed learning and knowledge-sharing routines appear in the reporting, but there is little public information on who receives systematic access, whether capability is assessed, how errors are

taught, or whether successful employee-builders advance through recognised learning pathways.

On **Authority Architecture**, reporters describe engineers tracing calculations and quality employees attending to flagged differences. Those details suggest retained human checking, but do not fully reveal approval rights, override powers, logging, decision ownership or incident-response arrangements for production use. The half-year report's reference to AI autonomous executions is at a different level and cannot fill that gap.

Career Architecture and Workforce Flow Architecture remain unproven. The sources provide no confirmed AI-caused redeployments, headcount reductions, hiring changes, pay changes or promotions linked to the documented 2026 workflows. Gong's earlier shift into a digital role must not be repurposed into such evidence.

Finally, **Measurement Architecture is still developing in the public record.** Changan reports programme activity; employees and managers describe specific step-time savings; the full value chain—accuracy, review burden, process completion, cost, workforce effect and employee wellbeing—has not been publicly reconciled.

WORKFORCE ARCHITECTURE

Workforce Architecture

FIGURE 02

Qualitative evidence

Workforce architecture evidence and gaps

Architecture domain	Evidenced here	Outstanding public evidence
Task	Some rule-intensive calculation, extraction and checking steps compressed	Error rates and full-task denominators ^[2]
Workflow	New script sequences, tool-enabled handoffs and exception flags	Full process maps and approval controls ^[5]
Role	Domain workers participate in building tools	Formal titles, job-description changes, accountabilities ^[2]
Capability	Domain knowledge becomes tool requirements and reusable Skills	Demonstrated proficiency and skills assessments ^[4]
Learning	Self-directed experimentation and sharing	Structured learning access and progression ^[4]
Authority	Engineering review and human exception work described	Approval, veto, override, logs and decision ownership ^[2]
Career	No AI-caused move established	Pay, grade, promotion and destination roles ^[4]
Workforce flow	No attributable headcount mechanism established	Hire/redeploy/non-backfill/attrition/exits ^[1]
Measurement	Company programme indicators and reported step times	Net cycle time, quality, ROI and worker outcomes ^[1]

Source: AIGW interpretation of the cited Changan evidence.

Note: 'Evidenced here' records reported work changes, not verified company-wide outcomes.

IMPLICATIONS

11. Implications for enterprise leaders

For CEOs and transformation leaders

Treat business experts as potential AI designers, but design the path from local invention to institution-wide reliability. Changan shows that an engineer or administrator can often articulate a work constraint more precisely than a distant platform team. A productive organisational model can support that knowledge with shared testing, integration, permissions and maintenance rather than requiring the original employee to become a full-time software engineer.

For CIOs and AI governance teams

Measure the transition at the workflow boundary. Record not only the minutes a tool takes to generate an output, but the time spent preparing data, checking answers, responding to errors, obtaining approval and closing the process. For a tool touching engineering parameters or regulatory documents, final authority and recourse need explicit definition.

For CHROs and learning leaders

Do not confuse new tasks with successful career transitions. Employee-built tools suggest new capability requirements and potential mobility pathways. A serious people strategy would test whether workers receive recognition, supervision, time to learn, equitable access and tangible progression, rather than assuming that participating in AI construction is automatically an improved job.

For public institutions

Measure implementation beyond adoption counts. China's sectoral AI initiatives create a context in which manufacturing enterprises can experiment with many applications. To understand workforce implications, surveys and institutional research should ask which tasks changed, who took on verification or tool-building duties, who gained training, and what happened to compensation, workload and mobility over time.

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12. Evidence boundaries: what we can and cannot say

Supported: Changan reports a sizeable organisational AI programme; multiple named workers and business units are described using or constructing AI-enabled tools; reported tasks include harness calculation, visualisation, scanner-compatible text, vehicle-document checking, packaging reviews, procurement Skills and customer-feedback analysis. Some reporting documents reuse across units and human review of outputs.

Not established: Independent validation of headline efficiency ratios; company-wide productivity attributable to QwenWork; net staffing effects; layoffs, non-backfill or job creation; formal reskilling completion; higher wages, grade or promotion; validated long-term capability gains; or fully specified human approval/override controls. The media coverage was concentrated around a common September site visit and can overrepresent successful demonstrations.

The strongest publication claim is therefore not that Changan has proved the economic model of an AI-native workforce. It is that the company provides **concrete reported episodes in which domain expertise is being converted into AI-enabled work tools**, highlighting the organisational

systems required to turn such episodes into durable, accountable capability.

Conclusion

Changan Automobile's case brings enterprise AI down to the level where work is actually performed. A harness engineer writes down calculation rules; a quality worker builds around a scanner limitation; a packaging administrator automates status handling; a procurement manager maintains reusable Skills. The technology is important, but each episode begins with knowledge of an operational constraint.

That is what makes the case more than an AI product story. It invites organisations to reconsider who can redesign work, who verifies its outputs, how local tools become common infrastructure and what future capability these new responsibilities will require.

AI adoption provides tools. Institution-building decides whether employee-created capabilities become reliable, accountable and valuable ways of working. The public evidence at Changan shows the first movements of this transition—and the measurements still needed to understand its consequences for people.

SOURCES AND METHOD

Sources and method

This Deep Dive is an independent AIGW interpretation of public documents and attributable journalism. It is **not** based on original interviews conducted by AIGW, independent time-motion measurement, or access to Changan's confidential HR and operations data. Several media accounts derive from the same 2 September 2026 site visit. Numerical task-time comparisons are reported claims. Government policy documents are contextual evidence, not proof of a causal link to company results. Source links below point to originating publishers where possible; attributable reproductions are identified when the original website is inaccessible to automated retrieval.

Source discipline: These articles and reports are cited for what they actually report; no source is presented as independently auditing the full transition. AIGW's framework analysis is interpretation, not an additional measurement.

1. COMPANY DISCLOSURE

[CA01] Chongqing Changan Automobile Company Limited. *2026 Half-Year Report*. 29 August 2026. Company disclosure.
[Official exchange-hosted PDF](#) [Text-readable reproduced filing](#)

2. ORIGINAL REPORTING AND ATTRIBUTED REPRODUCTIONS

[CA02] XinhuaNet. *千问办公落地长安汽车，‘研产供销服’都在用*. 3 September 2026. Original reporting.
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3. **[CA03]** Ye Jian · Economic Information Daily. *AI进车企：千问办公深入长安汽车‘研产供销服’*. 3 September 2026. Original reporting.
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4. **[CA04]** Qin Mingwei · International Financial News. *从提效到重塑组织：实探千问办公在长安汽车的AI落地样本*. 3 September 2026. Original publisher; attributed reproduction for readable text.
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5. **[CA05]** He Jipai · 21CBR / 21财经. *千问办公，进车厂干活*. 4 September 2026. Original reporting.
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6. **[CA06]** Xu Xin · Shuzhi Qianxian / 数智前线. *千问办公进长安*. 4 September 2026. Author-distributed article; edited by Ren Xiaoyu.
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7. **[CA07]** Wallstreetcn / AI原生Lab. *从2880分钟到5分钟，长安汽车让一线员工造AI工具*. 4 September 2026. Attributed syndication.
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8. **[CA08]** China Business Journal / 中国经营报. *当‘千问’遇到‘长安汽车’：一场AI驱动的生产力进化*. 6 September 2026. Attributed reproduction.
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9. CHINESE NATIONAL AND SECTORAL POLICY SOURCES

[P01] State Council. *Opinions on Deepening the ‘AI+’ Initiative* (国发〔2025〕11号). 26 August 2025. National policy context.
[Official text](#) [Official government mirror](#) [Official MIIT republication](#)

10. **[P02]** MIIT and seven other departments. *‘AI + Manufacturing’ Special Action Implementation Opinions* (工信部联科〔2025〕279号). Issued 25 December 2025; published 7 January 2026. Sectoral policy context.
[Official MIIT notification](#) [Full official policy and guidance](#)

11. **[P03]** MOHRSS, NDRC, MIIT and National Data Administration. *‘AI + Human Resources and Social Security’ Implementation Opinions* (人社部发〔2026〕40号). 8 July 2026. Sectoral policy context.
[Official text](#)